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 Meta-Analysis: A Critical Realist Critique and Alternative 
  
Abstract 
Meta-analysis has proved increasingly popular in management and 
organisation studies as a way of combining existing empirical 
quantitative research to generate a statistical estimate of how strongly 
variables are associated. Whilst a number of studies identify technical, 
procedural and practical limitations of meta-analyses, none have yet 
tackled the meta-theoretical flaws in this approach. We deploy critical 
realist meta-theory to argue that the individual quantitative studies, upon 
which meta-analysis relies, lack explanatory power because they are 
rooted in quasi-empiricist meta-theory. This problem, we argue, is 
carried over in meta-analyses.  We then propose a ‘Critical Realist 
Synthesis’ as a potential alternative to the use of meta-analysis in 
organisation studies and social science more widely.  
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1. Introduction 
 
According Bornmann & Mutz (2015) the quantity of published research doubles every nine 
years. This increases the appeal of methods that facilitate the integration and synthesis of 
existing research. Recently, social scientists, especially those working in management and 
organisation studies (MOS), have developed three basic methods to synthesise existing 
research: systematic review, meta-interpretation and meta-analysis (MA). This paper adds to 
a significant body of literature dedicated to critically evaluating MA. To date, critical 
evaluation has, primarily, engaged with the technical, procedural and practical problems of 
MA, and has, implicitly, presumed that resolving these problems is both necessary and 
sufficient to make MA more effective. Whilst these debates are welcome, they do not address 
the meta-theoretical underpinnings of MA, which is the focus of this paper. Our argument is 
that MA is of limited use in explaining the kind of social or organizational phenomena of 
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interest to readers of Human Relations – and cognate journals. This is not due to technical, 
procedural and practical problems in the application of MA, but due to the flawed meta-
theory underpinning MA. Instead, we propose an alternative that we refer to as `critical 
realist synthesis´ (CRS), rooted in an entirely different meta-theory – a term we use to include 
methodology, ontology, epistemology, aetiology, and concepts of explanation, prediction and 
theory. 
 
To make this argument, we start with an overview of MA, and provide a brief synopsis of 
some extant criticisms or what we term its ‘known problems’. We then provide a critical 
realist1 critique of the meta-theoretical underpinnings of MA by drawing on two highly cited 
recent pieces of MA to illustrate our argument. By way of contrast, we then outline CRS and 
argue, whilst it ostensibly provides less ‘certainty’ than MA, CRS generates greater 
explanatory power, and is based on more realistic ontological premises. 
 
2.0 What is MA? 
 
MA first appeared in the field of medicine in 1904 as a method of aggregating data from 
experimental research. After World War Two it expanded into the fields of psychology, 
education and social science research. The primary aim of contemporary MA is to compute a 
weighted mean of effect size between phenomena; the secondary aim is to identify 
moderating (and mediating) variables. Let us take a closer look: 
 
Meta-analysis, literally the statistical analysis of statistical analyses, describes a 
set of procedures for systematically reviewing the research examining a particular 
effect, and combining the results of independent studies to estimate the size of the 
effect in the population ... The outcome of a meta-analysis is a weighted mean 
effect size which reflects the population effect size more accurately than any of 
the individual estimates (Ellis 2010: 94-5). 
 
[M]eta-analysis is ... a method that estimates an overall `effect-size´ of a range of 
studies from the individual effect sizes of each individual study, thus giving 
                                                 
1 We recognise that CR is a broad church, encompassing original critical realism, dialectical critical realism, the 
‘spiritual turn’, and other variants. The theorising we propose here is based on the original tenents of critical 
realism (Bhaskar 1975), but is equally compatible with (though perhaps less interesting to) any of the 
subsequent versions. 
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greater ‘power’ to the overall statistic. It does this by calculating a mean of means 
of means: in the original study, a mean is taken of the effects of a particular 
variable for all points in a study, then variables are averaged to provide an overall 
effect size (mean) for that study, and then the effect sizes of a number of studies 
are averaged in the MA procedure (Weed 80-81). 
 
An effect can be the result of a treatment revealed in a comparison between 
groups (e.g., [medically] treated and untreated groups) or it can describe the 
degree of association between two related variables (e.g., treatment dosage and 
health). An effect size refers to the magnitude of the result as it occurs, or would 
be found, in the population. (Ellis 2010: 4, 6-7) 
 
`Effect size´ is a measure of the association or relationship between two variables across a 
range of carefully selected studies. Such analysis presumes that values of independent 
variables will be related to, or associated with, values of dependent variables if they are 
observed to regularly occur together with sufficient frequency, with statistical techniques 
being deployed to identify this association and its properties. On the presumption that the 
association is causal, independent variables are thought to have a (causal) effect on dependent 
variables. The term `effect size´, then, refers to the magnitude of the association between 
independent and dependent variables. This then forms the basis for testing meta-hypotheses. 
 
If the MA fails to explain an (arbitrary) 75% of the variance, or we know in advance that 
there are significant differences in effect sizes across studies, then a moderator analysis can 
be conducted: 
 
Moderation represents the idea that the magnitude of the effect of an antecedent 
(e.g., organizational structure or strategy) on firm outcomes depends on 
contingency factors, such as the uncertainty and instability of the environment ... 
[M]oderation refers to the conditions under which an effect varies in size, 
whereas mediation refers to underlying mechanisms and processes that connect 
antecedents and outcomes (Aguinis et al., 2013: 1-2) 
 
MA assumes that the effective aggregation of information creates greater statistical power 
than that derived from any single study, and that results from individual studies are 
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generalisable to a larger population: to ‘translate statistical relations into successful recipes 
for individual organizations’ (Hodgkinson and Rousseau 2009). The ability to determine 
causes and effects is ostensibly enhanced as the population grows (as more studies are added 
to the MA) and inconsistencies between results are quantified and assessed. Moderators and 
mediators can also be included in an attempt to `explain´ variation between results and the 
presence of forms of bias.  
 
These benefits have been asserted in some sections of the MOS field, wherein the value of 
MA has even expanded beyond the realm of synthesis, and towards claiming the generation 
of new knowledge: 
 
Beyond overcoming difficulties associated with individual studies such as sampling 
error, measurement error and restriction of range, MA enable an analyst to synthesise 
the findings of primary studies to test hypotheses that were not testable in those 
studies (Eden, 2002: 841) 
 
Having outlined the basic premise of MA, we now briefly outline the known technical, 
technical, procedural and practical issues with the practice of MA, before moving on to our 
realist critique. 
 
2.1 Known problems 
 
The many technical, procedural and practical (i.e. collection of source data) challenges 
involved in conducting MA have been detailed by a number of authors. First, there is a lack 
of agreement on the basic methods to assess effect size, which in turn produce significantly 
differing results. Whilst calculating effect size requires the subtraction of the mean of the 
control group from the mean of experimental group and dividing the difference by the 
standard deviation, there is no agreement on how this standard deviation is calculated (see 
Glass, 2000; Hough and Hall 1994). 
 
The practical task of constructing a sample also provides a number of issues for MA. The MA 
literature seldom discusses inclusion criteria for data (Rousseau et al., 2008: 491), despite the 
fact that these cannot be generalised across MA. Inclusion criteria are thus ultimately 
judgement calls that vary by the research topic and researcher preferences, yet they impact 
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clearly upon the calculation of effect sizes as they define the source material that constitute 
the analysis. This leads to a problem with publication bias, as published results tend to be 
those that show strong statistical outcomes (Rousseau, et al., 2008). Thus, MA tends to over-
represent positive results whilst dramatically underreporting those that are null. This has led 
some to argue that results reported as statistically significant may have inbuilt exaggeration 
bias (Rossi, 1987). 
 
Relatedly, the validity of effect sizes is a function of the homogeneity of included studies 
(Miller, 1987). This poses a paradox as studies with large sample sizes are privileged, which 
mitigates against the possibility of pooling sufficient homogeneity in terms of research foci, 
especially in social science research. Whilst on the face of it, greater inclusion seem to follow 
the internal logic of MA by increasing the scope and sample size of the analysis, Coyne et al., 
(2011:224) show that including very small scale research in MA is likely to lead to 
‘overestimate effects’ which statistical techniques cannot correct. 
 
The extent to which source studies can be combined is also dependent upon the degree of 
similarity (in terms of definitions, interpretations of key variables, and the deployment of data 
capture techniques) between studies (Linden and Priestley, 2009). However, the codification 
of the process though which this is achieved, is often significantly truncated or even omitted 
in publication. Similarly, the nuanced way in which theories and concepts inform the design 
and operationalisation of the original studies is crucial. Data from original studies require 
manipulation and tabulation to perform MA and, given that these were generated for 
alternative purposes, it is problematic to match the theoretical perspective of the meta-analyst 
and the original research, if the original data is even accessible at all (Cowton, 1998). The 
consequence of this is that effect size analysis may therefore amalgamate statistical findings 
based on differing interpretations of the theoretical hypothesis as well as differentially 
operationalised constructs of study. 
 
A further challenge for MA relates to the quality of source data: any given range of source 
data is likely to display variability in terms of the extent to which they possess internal 
(elimination of bias) and external validity (Franke, 2001). The MA analyst takes for granted 
that what the original analyst did to code the data into concepts is reliable, so one’s measures 
could be very different across studies. This means that the extent to which the results can be 
generalised to their target population is at best questionable. Moreover: 
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method variance is pervasive, ubiquitous, almost invariably in social and behavioural 
science, each array of measurements … contains variance associated with the method. 
Any obtained relationship between two such units can be due to method variance 
(Fiske 1982: 82). 
 
Generalisation on the basis of studies with reliability issues will therefore accentuate rather 
than reduce, or correct for, error, and may reflect manipulations of non-comparable 
independent variables and their effects on non-comparable dependent measures. 
 
3.0 A critical realist critique of MA 
 
Whilst the technical, procedural and practical issues with meta-analyses are notable, our 
critique is not based upon these. Indeed even if these problems were resolved, our critique, 
which is meta-theoretical, would remain. To the best of our knowledge, no meta-theoretical 
critique of MA has been undertaken (although, see Pawson 2004). Let us start with 
establishing some basic terms and ideas that will inform the rest of the paper. 
 
First, we use the term ‘causal mechanism’ generically, to refer to things like `social 
structures´, `cultural structures´, `institutions´, `conventions, `norms´, `rules´, and so on. An 
HRM practice, or a discourse could, for example be causal mechanisms. The term 
‘mechanism’ carries no connotations of simple additive effects or determinism. It simply 
refers to a thing that has causal powers or, in layperson's language, the ability to affect things. 
A causal mechanism is causal in virtue of the powers it possesses as derived from its 
properties. The causal powers of any mechanism only become enabled when enacted by 
human agents. When, therefore, we refer to a mechanism causing this or that, we always have 
in mind an agentially enacted mechanism. 
 
Second, we use the term `quantitative empirical studies´ to refer to those studies employing 
quantitative data and statistical research techniques, typically regression analysis. They 
should not be confused with qualitative empirical studies such as ethnographies, case studies, 
in-depth interviews, participant observation and such like2. 
                                                 
2Some research appears to be qualitative because, for example, it is uses interview techniques. But, if the 
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Third, for CRs, the objective of social science is not to predict but to explain. This is achieved 
by identifying, and theorising: an appropriate, (qua relevant) agent (A); an appropriate causal 
mechanism3 (M); how agent (A) interprets, and enacts mechanism (M), generating tendencies 
(T) towards outcome (O); other mechanisms, often referred to as `the context´, (Mc) that 
dispose agent A to interact with M and not (say) N. Any putative explanation can then be 
empirically substantiated - i.e. successfully tested, which does not involve simply testing 
quantitative hypotheses. We refer to this as generating theoretically informed and empirically 
substantiated explanations.  
 
Fourth, quantitative empirical studies, that provide the source material for MA, are rooted in 
a meta-theory we call ‘quasi-empiricism’4 and comes with a `chain of meta-theoretical 
concepts´ (Fleetwood 2014), especially ontology, epistemology, methodology, aetiology, and 
concepts relating to open and closed systems, theory, prediction and explanation5. Let us look 
a little closer at this chain of meta-theoretical concepts. 
 
Ontology 
Observed (empirical) events or states of affairs, are the ultimate phenomena about which 
quasi-empiricists collect data - e.g. size of organisations; presence of teamwork; being 
female; employee performance. If these events are observed (or proxied) in terms of quantity 
or degree, they become variables – i.e. quantified events. The ontology consists, therefore, of 
observed events or states or affairs that are unique, unconnected or atomistic. 
 
 
Epistemology 
Whilst quantitative empirical researchers are probably aware that the variables they measure 
represent causal mechanisms, broadly conceived, their focus is always on the events these 
                                                                                                                                                        
analysis ends up quantifying the data from interviews, then it is more accurate to define this as quantitative 
research. 
3We use the singular here (agent and mechanism) for ease of exposition. Most of the time, we 
will have to use the plural (agents and mechanisms). 
4Some use the term, `positivism´. We think `scientism´ is a more accurate description, but stick with the term 
`quasi-empiricism´ to avoid getting embroiled in philosophical definitions that are tangential. For elaboration of 
positivism/empiricism in MOS see Donaldson (1996, 2003, 2005); Johnson & Duberley (2000); and Fleetwood 
& Hesketh (2010). 
5For a CR interpretation of quasi-empiricism´s meta-theoretical underpinnings see Danermark (2002); Sayer 
(2010); Fleetwood (2014) and Fleetwood & Hesketh (2010). 
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mechanisms generate6. If, as presumed, particular knowledge is gained through observing 
events, more general or ‘scientific’ knowledge is gained only if these events manifest 
themselves as regularities in the flux of events or states of affairs7. This is usually styled 
‘whenever event x1….xn then event y’ or y = f(x1….xn). 
 
Together, this ontological and this epistemological position imply a `flat´ ontology – the 
assumption that all that exists are events (or actions) and people’s perceptions of these events 
(Table 1). 
 
 
Domain Entity 
Empirical Experiences & perceptions 
Actual Events & actions 
 
Table 1. A `flat’ ontology 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The method of quasi-empiricism seeks to generate predictions, typically in the form of 
hypotheses to be refuted or supported via the collection of quantitative data. The only 
phenomena that feature in quantitative empirical research are those capable of being 
transposed into variables - i.e. the quantified expression of events. What cannot be quantified 
adequately is omitted. 
 
 
 
 
 Aetiology 
 
                                                 
6For example, Roth et al, (2010: 275) refer to the `weakening of stereotypes or other related mechanisms´; 
Shirom et al, (2008: 1376) refer to `coping mechanisms´; and Subramony (2010: 747, 759) refers to `feedback 
mechanisms´ and `goal setting and reinforcing mechanisms´. 
7For ease of exposition, we drop the term, `states of affairs´ and refer, simply, to `events´. 
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The notion of causation pre-supposed by quasi-empiricism is referred to as the regularity view of 
causation. As its ontology is of observed atomistic events, its concept of causality cannot be 
conceived of in terms of anything other than events and their regularity. As the epistemology 
of quasi-empiricism is reliant upon identifying event regularities, its conceptualisation of 
causation requires knowledge of event regularities. To know the cause of increased 
organisational performance is, for example, to know that it is regularly preceded by the 
introduction a bundle of HRM practices. More generally, to know the cause of event y, requires 
us to know (no more than) that event x, or events x1, x2...xn, is/are regularly conjoined to event 
y. 
 
It is worth adding that conclusions are often, usually implicitly, given a universal and general 
`twist´, along with a spurious precision. For example, in their analysis of performance related 
pay (PRP) (Gielen et al. 2010: 291) write that: ‘PRP increases productivity at the firm level 
by 9%’. It is not clear if this is understood as a `one off´, or whether this is supposedly 
generalizable to all firms. If the latter, the `9%´ looks to be an example of spurious precision.   
 
Open and closed systems 
 
The quasi-empiricist commitment to causality as regularities in the flux of events requires 
that social or organisational systems are theorised or modelled as if they are closed systems, 
defined thus: Parts of the socio-economic world characterised by regularities in the flux of 
events (or states of affairs) of the form `whenever event x then event y´, or y = f(x) are closed 
systems, and parts of this world not so characterised are open systems (See Bhaskar 1978, 
Lawson 1995 and Fleetwood 2016). Crucially, statistical techniques like regression analysis 
not only presuppose, but only work in, closed systems. Methodologically speaking, 
quantitative empirical researchers of organisation studies must `engineer´ closed systems 
(only in theory, because a real open system such as an organisation cannot be closed) so they 
can write things like: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Empowerment-enhancing bundles [of HRM practices] will be 
positively correlated with business outcomes (Subramony 2009: 748). 
 
This translates to `whenever empowerment-enhancing bundles (EEB), then business 
outcome´, or `outcome = f(EEB)´ and, by definition, this describes a closed system. 
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Variations in regularity are generally specified probabilistically or stochastically, as random 
processes occurring in the ontic domain. Probability is a measure of the likelihood of an 
event occurring. The re-conceptualisation of stochastic event regularities using the concepts 
of probability, might be styled ‘whenever event x, then on average event y’, or y = f(x + ε) or 
more accurately, `whenever the realised value of the (independent) variable measuring event 
or state of affairs x, then the conditional mean8 of the (dependent) variable measuring event 
or state of affairs y’. The error term (ε) presents random influences on the dependent variable 
y and consequently converts the mathematical model linking y to the x into a stochastic or 
statistical model representing the population of interest (Downward 2015: 210). If an 
empirical researcher managed to identify a stochastic event regularity (perhaps over a 
restricted space/time) then s/he will have identified a stochastically closed system. 
Henceforth, we use the phrase `event regularities, probabilistically specified’, to refer to the 
kind of associations identified by statistical techniques such as regression analysis and MA. 
(Fleetwood 2016). 
 
Theory 
 
A theory is often said to have a predictive dimension containing statements delivering 
predictions such as ‘y will follow x’; and an explanatory dimension containing statements 
delivering `explanation´ which, amounts to the same thing. ‘Theory’, then, becomes reduced 
to a set of statements designed to enable predictions, usually, in the form of hypotheses. We 
describe this as `theory´- i.e. with scare quotes - because, in our example, a ‘theory’ that 
explains an increase in organisation performance, is reduced to a statement to the effect that `a 
bundle of HRM practices were introduced´. Whilst other information, perhaps identifying the 
relevant causal agentially enacted mechanisms, is sometimes included, it is, strictly speaking, 
not necessary. This is sometimes referred to as `ultra-empiricism´ or `measurement without 
theory´. 
 
 
 
Prediction and (lack of) explanation 
 
                                                 
8Or conditional expectation, conditional expected value or conditional distribution. The approach is 
consequently often referred to as the ‘average economic regression’ approach (Downward 2015: 2011). 
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Prediction for quasi-empiricism is based upon induction from past regularities in the flux of 
events. This conflates prediction and explanation. This illicit conflation is commonly referred 
to as the ‘symmetry thesis’, whereby the only difference between explanation and prediction 
relates to the direction of time (i.e. if x predicts y, then x is said to `explain´ y). For example, 
if the introduction of teamworking was found to predict an increase in profitability, then the 
former, would be said to `explain´ the latter. This conflation manifests itself in the way 
independent variables are commonly referred to as `explanatory variables´, and/or 
`predictors´ of the magnitude of dependent variables. This is, however, a misconception. 
Imagine that a regression analysis identifies an association between the introduction of 
teamworking and an increase in profitability, or put another way, imagine that the 
introduction of teamworking predicts the increase in profitability. Is anything explained by 
this? The answer is no. A prediction, even a successful one, explains nothing. A regression 
analysis, even one that successfully identifies an association between independent and 
dependent variables, does not reveal why the association comes about and, therefore, lacks 
explanatory power. 
 
Summary 
 
The lack of explanatory power in individual quantitative empirical studies, rooted as they are 
in quasi-empiricist meta-theory, is the result of their commitment to the particular chain of 
meta-theoretical concepts – i.e. an ontology of events or states of affairs; causality as event 
regularity; epistemology based upon identifying event regularities probabilistically specified; 
a method of building theoretically closed systems to engineer the event regularities that 
generate predictions to be tested qua hypotheses; and theory as sets of statements that `set up´ 
the event regularities as predictions, which are then conflated with `explanations´. As these 
studies cannot generate explanations, they cannot generate theoretically informed and 
empirically substantiated explanations either. Unfortunately, this problem is not restricted to 
individual quantitative empirical studies but, as we will see below, carries over into MA more 
generally. 
 
We envisage two potential responses from advocates of MA. First, they might find, demand, 
or carry out individual studies, including quantitative studies, which do have explanatory 
power, or insist on them being used as the appropriate basis for MA. Second, they might 
counter-argue that MA does not lack explanatory power. All MA has sections referred to as 
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‘theory’, ‘literature review’, ‘hypothesis building’, or some such, and it is in these sections 
that theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations can be found. 
Unfortunately, these responses will not work. Apropos the first response, whilst qualitative 
empirical research is essential in the search for theoretically informed and empirically 
substantiated explanations (Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014; see also Edwards et al., 2014), it is 
precisely this material that is excluded from MA: 
 
'weed out all those papers that do not report data ... as well as those studies that 
are based on the analysis of qualitative data (e.g., ethnographies…and case 
studies). Getting rid of these types of papers is straightforward (Ellis 2005: 98). 
 
Furthermore, in order to find or carry out quantitative studies that do have explanatory power, 
they would have to be rooted in an alternative meta-theory, one not committed to the chain of 
meta-theoretical concepts noted above. Yet, quantitative empirical researchers cannot just 
abandon their commitment to this or that meta-theoretical concept, because these concepts 
only `work´ as a complete package. The alternative, which we propose later, is that we should 
abandon this entire chain of meta-theoretical concepts, and replace it with an alternative. 
 
3.1. Illustrating the meta-theoretical problems with MA 
 
To illustrate our critique, we have selected two recent, highly-cited examples of meta-
analyses, published in top ranked journals in the authors’ areas of interest. In the first paper, 
Reichl et al., (2014) explore the relation between work-nonwork conflict and burnout by 
conducting a meta-analysis of 86 relevant studies, which allows for an analysis of 220 
coefficients. In the second, Subramony (2009) explores the relationship between bundles of 
HR practices and specifically defined organizational outcomes. This is achieved through a 
MA of 65 relevant studies, which allows for an analysis of 239 separately reported effect 
sizes. Both are examples of `best practice´ MA and the criticisms we raise apply to all the 
examples of MA we are familiar with. 
 
 
 
Reichl et al. 
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First, in a (half-page) section entitled `theoretical framework´, Reichl et al. mention `several 
theoretical reasons to expect relations between work–nonwork conflict and burnout´ (p.982-
3). After a very short theoretical discussion they refer the reader to six sources where, 
presumably, the theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations informing 
their MA might be found. Further inspection, however, reveals this not to be the case. One 
study is just another MA; two are `standard´ quantitative studies seeking empirical 
regularities; three offer theoretical insight, but are not qualitative empirical studies, and two 
are extremely dated. Their `theoretical framework´ section, then, offers little or nothing in the 
way of theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanation. 
 
Second, Reichl et al.´s MA tells us that work–nonwork conflict was correlated with emotional 
exhaustion and cynicism, but these relations were moderated by gender, age, family 
characteristics and cultural norms. They are aware of “important gaps in our knowledge about 
underlying processes [i.e. causal mechanisms] and moderating variables” (pg 980), and their 
remedy is to obtain “theoretically derived moderators” - i.e. to theoretically derive the 
moderating causal mechanisms. Whilst this looks like a potential source of theoretically 
informed and empirically substantiated explanation informing their MA, further inspection 
reveals this not to be the case. Apropos the moderator variable gender: one study is a 
theoretically informed quantitative analysis; four are `standard´ quantitative studies, despite 
one having `multi-method´ in the title; and two are dated. Concerning the moderator variable 
family characteristics: two are `standard´ quantitative studies and two are meta-analyses. For 
the ‘age’ variable, there is only a `standard´ quantitative study. Apropos the moderator 
cultural norms: four studies are `standard´ quantitative studies; one is another MA; and two 
are overviews/reviews. None of these references offer the kind of theoretically informed and 
empirically substantiated explanation that would be needed to derive the moderating causal 
mechanisms. This point is developed in more detail later. 
 
Subramony (2009) 
 
Let us turn our attention now to the other example of MA: Subramony´s paper on HRM 
bundles and firm performance. 
 
[HRM] bundles consisting of multiple complementary practices are typically 
considered superior to individual best practices in influencing firm performance. 
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This study investigates the relationship between three such bundles 
(empowerment, motivation, and skill-enhancing) and business outcomes…. 
Although it makes conceptual sense to categorize individual HRM practices into 
these bundles, there is insufficient empirical evidence regarding both their 
proposed synergistic properties and the magnitude of bundle effects on firm 
performance. I propose to bridge this gap in the strategic HRM literature by 
investigating the relationship between empowerment, motivation, and skill 
bundles and various business outcomes; clarifying the synergistic properties of 
these bundles by comparing their effects to those of individual HRM practices; 
and demonstrating the usefulness of these bundles in relation to high-performance 
work systems (HPWSs) (Subramony 2009: 745-6, emphasis added) 
 
To say that there is insufficient empirical evidence regarding (π), the proposed synergistic 
properties of bundles of HRM practices, is entirely correct. Subramony´s observation that 
there is insufficient empirical evidence regarding (Ω), the magnitude of bundle effects on 
firm performance has valid and invalid elements. It is invalid in the sense that there are 
actually many quantitative empirical studies seeking to identify the magnitude of bundle 
effects on firm performance. It is, however, valid in the sense that what evidence there is does 
not support the existence of the statistical association he believes exists. Subramony proposes 
to `bridge this gap´ by (a) investigating the relationship between these bundles and business 
outcomes; (b) clarifying the synergistic properties of these bundles by comparing their effects 
to those of individual HRM practices; and (c) demonstrating the usefulness of these bundles 
in relation to HPWS. Notice, however, that there are two `gaps´ - i.e. (π) and (Ω). At best MA 
can deal with (Ω) by engaging in (a) and (c). What MA cannot do, however, is deal with (π) 
via (b). It cannot bridge the gap of insufficient empirical evidence regarding the proposed 
synergistic properties of bundles of HRM because to do this would require theoretically 
informed and empirically substantiated explanations of why empowerment, motivation, and 
skill-enhancing HRM practices cause increased performance. MA cannot get anywhere near 
delivering explanations of this kind. 
 
This said, as with Reich et al., Subramony´s MA is not entirely devoid of theoretically 
informed explanations - although few of them are empirically substantiated. He writes: 
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The combination of multiple empowerment-enhancing practices…is likely to be 
synergistic because of the potential complementarities among these practices. For 
instance, allowing autonomous work teams to manage the production of a 
component or provision of a specific service can enhance employees’ sense of 
responsibility and autonomy within the constraints of their work role. 
Additionally, the provision of voice and upward feedback mechanisms can help 
employees view themselves as part of a larger organizational system, leading 
them to engage in discretionary behaviors, including suggesting improvements to 
the products, services, or work processes; assuming increased responsibilities; 
and volunteering (e.g., serving on joint management-worker task forces). Also, 
the presence of multiple empowerment-related practices is likely to signal a 
coherent organization wide commitment to employee empowerment, which is 
likely to result in reciprocation in the form of in-role and extra-role behaviors 
(Subramony 2009: 748). 
 
Subramony´s brief explanations for the existence of synergies are not unreasonable, but any 
competent researcher in this field could come up with reasonable explanations about dis-
synergies. The fact is, we do not really know which is the case because there are insufficient 
theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations of the proposed synergies. 
Moreover, MA brings us no closer to obtaining these explanations because it focuses our 
attention on identifying statistical associations, such as that underlying `Hypothesis 1: 
Empowerment-enhancing bundles [of HRM practices] will be positively correlated with 
business outcomes´ (Subramony 2009: 748). 
 
Let us consider an example of how statistical techniques used in MA can often lead us further 
into obscurity. 
 
By calculating the composites of relevant effect sizes within each study, I created 
the empowerment, motivation, and skill bundles. For instance, if a given study 
provided correlations between training and productivity and selection and 
productivity, a single composite score was created to reflect the combined effect 
of both the skill-enhancing practices of training and selection on productivity 
(Subramony 2009: 753). 
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Subramony takes past research showing correlations between training and productivity, and 
selection and productivity, and combines them into a single composite score reflecting the 
combined effect of training and selection on productivity. Whatever the advantages of doing 
this are, they have to be weighed against the dis-advantages. And the main disadvantage is 
this; to know that there are correlations between training and productivity, and selection and 
productivity is not to explain anything – i.e. we remain in the dark as to why these 
correlations come about. But then to combine them into a single score reflecting their 
combined effect on productivity leaves us with an even more complex statistical association 
about which we actually understand even less. We are moving further away from generating 
theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations, not getting closer to them. 
 
Note that this has nothing to do with missing moderating or mediating variables. Indeed, if it 
turned out that additional moderating or mediating variables were needed, the problems 
would get even worse: we would end up with yet more variables, and yet more associations 
between them, and be no closer to deriving theoretically informed and empirically 
substantiated explanations. 
 
Moreover, what can be done, practically, with Subramony’s argument that:  
 
‘firms can benefit from the adoption of high-performance HRM practices… as 
long as these practices also are complementary. Thus, instead of simply 
increasing the number of HRM practices…firms could derive positive returns by 
enhancing synergy among these practices (Subramony 2006: 759). 
 
The only way this finding could be of substantive, or practical use, would be if it enabled an 
HR manager to successfully predict (solely on the basis of past event regularities) that the 
implementation of a bundle of complementary high-performance HRM practices would be 
followed by increased organisational performance in some future period. Even if an HR 
manager was prepared to implement the bundle, s/he would need to know a great deal more 
about how exactly to `enhance synergy among these practices´ than can be provided in such 
research. For the practitioner, therefore, these exhortations require a peculiar leap of faith that 
diminishes their own insight, experience and expertise. The implication is that the HR 
manager should sacrifice any experienced insight as to why certain HR practices may, or may 
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not, work in their own context, and instead follow the numbers. One is left feeling that the 
HR professional might be usefully replaced with an algorithm. 
 
Summary 
 
Section 3 established that the lack of explanatory power that characterises individual 
quantitative studies, rooted in quasi-empiricist meta-theory, is the result of its commitment to 
a particular chain of meta-theoretical concepts. Unfortunately, this problem carries over into 
MA. Despite MA having dedicated `theoretical´ sections, the latter carry little in the way of 
explanation and, therefore, can offer little prospect of theoretically informed and empirically 
substantiated explanations. The explanations contained in MA are as lacking in explanatory 
power as the individual quantitative studies upon which they are based. Allow us to make the 
point more forcefully: if one individual quantitative study lacks explanatory power, then 
synthesizing scores of them does not increase the explanatory power. 
 
Does this mean that all attempts to synthesise existing research are doomed to failure? We 
think not, but only if we turn to an alternative approach, that we call critical realist synthesis 
(CRS), that is rooted in an entirely different meta-theory. It is to this that we now turn. 
 
4.0 A critical realist alternative9 
 
In order to see exactly where CRS differs from MA, we present CR´s chain of meta-
theoretical concepts, in the same format as we did for quasi-empiricism in part 3. 
 
Ontology 
 
As well as the actual and the empirical (Table 1) CRs recognise the existence of the ‘deep’ 
(Table 2). This stratified ontology is also emergent, meaning that entities existing at one `level´ 
are rooted in, but irreducible to, entities existing at another `level´. For example, the social is 
rooted in, but irreducible to the biological, which is rooted in, but irreducible to the chemical, 
which is rooted in, but irreducible to the atomic, and so on. (Elder-Vass 2010). Social reality is 
also transformational; Agents reproduce or transform a set of pre-existing mechanisms. Society 
                                                 
9For an introduction of how we might go about gaining these insights, see Dirpal (2015). 
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continues to exist only because agents reproduce or transform the mechanisms that causally 
condition their social actions. 
 
 
Domain Entity 
Empirical Experiences & perceptions 
Actual Events & actions 
‘Deep’ Structures, mechanisms, tendencies, 
powers 
 
Table 2. A stratified or laminated ontology 
 
In a social world, characterised by stratification, emergence, transformation, and, typically, 
configurations of interacting causal mechanisms, it is unsuprising to find partial, 
approximate, rough-and-ready regularities or patterns in the flux of events. Following 
Lawson (1997, 2003: 81-83 and 105-7), we refer to these as `demi-regs´, which can be styled 
as `whenever event x, then sometimes, but not always event y´; for example, `women 
sometimes, but not always, look after children more than men´. A system wherein demi-regs 
predominate, is an open system. Thus, whilst any explanations CR generate should `fit´ with 
the statistical record, the statistical record explains nothing in itself (see also Porpora, 2015).  
 
Epistemology 
 
With the recognition that events do not often manifest as regularities and that something must 
govern an irregular flux of events, the emphasis of CR investigation switches from the domains 
of the empirical and actual to the deep: the causal mechanisms that govern the flux of events. 
For example, we noted the claim that the introduction of PRP increases productivity at the 
firm level by 9% (op. cit). CRs might re-focus attention towards the mechanisms by which 
the relationship might occur: the motivation of some, but not all, individuals to increase their 
effort towards those metrics which are being measured, or the impact of labour relations on 
such motivation. In weighing up explanations, CR´s accept the possibility of judging between 
competing claims because they reject the claim that to accept epistemic relativism is to accept 
judgmental relativism. That said, there is no gainsaying the difficulty involved with this, 
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especially when such judgement requires far more than simply carrying out statistically-based 
hypothesis testing to see which competing theories have greater explanatory power10.  
 
Aetiology 
 
The parts of the social world not characterised by event regularities (i.e. open systems) are still 
governed by something. This something cannot be a law as this would produce constant 
regularities. So instead, CRs use the term tendency to depict the (transfactual) way of acting of 
a thing (or things) with properties (Fleetwood 2009). A tendency is not an empirically 
observable pattern as a tendency can be in play and yet not manifest itself empirically, as it be 
counteracted by other mechanisms (Fleetwood 2012: 13). 
 
To illustrate causation, CRs seek what Hesketh & Fleetwood (2010) refer to as `thick 
explanation´- i.e. the kind of explanation that requires hermeneutic information - i.e. information 
relating to a range of human cognitive activities such as understanding, intention, purpose, 
meaning, interpretation, reason and so on. We do not, however, know what the cause of the 
action is, one does not understand it, until we know the intention that underlies it, that is, until 
we know why the agent did what s/he did. If, to explain an action is to give a causal account of 
it, then to explain an action is to give an account of why the actor did what s/he did. Whilst 
exploring motivations is always difficult, these can be explored using interviews. Sims-Schouten 
& Riley (2014) and Smith & Elger (2014) show, for instance, how interview-based research 
facilitates the probing of agent’s own understandings of causal relations in organizational 
contexts. 
 
Methodology 
 
As the social world is an open system, mechanisms cannot be induced or deduced, but must 
instead be retroduced and retrodicted. Retroduction 'consists of a movement [...] from the 
conception of some phenomenon of interest to a conception of some totality or thing, 
mechanism, structure or condition that is responsible for that given phenomena' (Lawson, 
2003: 145). It usually involves asking a specific kind of question: ‘What thing, if it existed, 
                                                 
10 That said, it would be remiss of us not to point out that CRs have no single criterion for identifying what 
constitutes explanatory power, and the concept is in need of further elaboration (Lawson 2003: chapter 4; 
Fleetwood & Hesketh 2010: chapter 6).   
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might account for the existence of P’? and might end up identifying Q as the thing in 
question. Retrodiction is used when we are relatively ignorant about the mechanisms in 
operation that are causing the phenomena under investigation. When there is little or no 
existing theory to act as a guide, we must take a voyage of discovery, make hypothetical 
conjectures, requiring the ‘scientific imagination’ (See Lewis 1999). We use what we do 
know to explain what we do not know. 
 
Open and closed systems 
 
In open systems, theoretically informed claims must be framed in transfactual terms. 
Transfactual claims cannot, however, be empirically substantiated by testing quantitative 
hypotheses. Consider two hypotheses: the first is typical of quasi-empiricism and the second 
is transfactual. 
 
H1 Workers assembled into a team increase profit 
H2 Workers assembled into a team tend to increase profit 
 
The intuition underlying H1 is something like `workers assembled into a team raise the 
probability that profit will increase´. This presumes the existence of a (ontic) stochastic 
regularity, which can be re-conceptualised probabilistically, between assembling workers into 
a team, and the resulting increase in profit. H1 can be tested using `normal´ statistical 
techniques. In complete contrast, the intuition underlying H2 is something like `workers 
assembled into a team have the causal power to raise profit, but sometimes this power is 
actualised and sometimes it is not'. This gives rise to a demi-regularity, rather than a 
stochastic regularity, and thus cannot be re-conceptualised probabilistically. H2 cannot be 
tested using the `normal´ statistical methods rendering quasi-empirical methods such as MA 
unsuitable for open-systems theorising. 
  
Prediction and explanation 
 
CRs hold that, in open systems ‘thick’ explanation is probably our only guide to the future. If, 
for example, one can uncover, and explain, the causal mechanisms (e.g. HR practices) that, 
when drawn upon by workers and managers, increase organisational performance, then one 
has an explanation of the increase in performance. Such an explanation would allow one to 
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understand the tendencies generated when workers and managers engage with HR practices. If 
one understands these tendencies one can make tendential predictions. 
 
Importantly, and in contrast to the empiricist tradition, which focuses only on what actually 
happens, powers or tendencies for critical realist are transfactual, and therefore point to the 
potential of entities. Thus, given the appropriate context (i.e. products, production regimes, 
labour relations systems) one mechanism may have more potential to increase performance 
than another, even if this potential is continually negated by countervailing tendencies. This is 
important because, unlike MA, it points to theorising the possibilities of future social events, 
caused by agentially enacted mechanisms, even if these events have not occurred in the past. 
 
Theory 
 
For CRs, theory consists of statements that deliver causal explanations. We can illustrate this 
by returning to our previous example: if we want to explain the tendency for team-working to 
increase productivity, we might look to existing theory about the relations within teams, 
seeking to develop new insights about (i) exactly how teams (as bundles of causal 
mechanisms) raise productivity; (ii) how agents are engaged with them; and (iii) the complex 
set of interactions between the bundles themselves and between the agents. 
 
Summary 
 
In sum, a CR chain of meta-theoretical concepts can be contrasted to that of quasi-empiricism 
in which MA is rooted (Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 Quasi-empiricism 
 
Critical realism 
Ontology Atomistic, observable, events 
No agency-structure approach, only rational 
agents as individuals. 
Social world is stratified or laminated, emergent, 
transformational, systemically open, complex, 
becoming, processual & relational. 
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Agents & structures (i.e. mechanisms) are distinct but 
related. 
Epistemology Knowledge derives from (a) observing (b) 
event regularities. 
 
 
Knowledge derives from uncovering causal 
mechanisms. 
Epistemically but not judgementally relativist. 
 
Aetiology Humean: causality as event regularity. 
Laws, law-like relations & functional 
relations. 
Separates Humean causality from causality as powers 
& tendencies. 
Powers & tendencies replace laws, law-like relations 
& functional relations. 
Methodology & 
research 
technique 
Some version of the covering law method 
Engineering event regularities via 
theoretically closed systems. 
Exclusively quantitative data & techniques 
such as regression, analysis of variance, factor 
analysis & meta-analysis 
Causal-explanatory. 
Explanation comes via uncovering & understanding 
causal mechanisms. 
Ethnography, participant observation, in-depth 
interviewing critical discourse analysis, action 
research, archaeology, deconstruction & genealogy 
accepted. 
Mainly uses qualitative techniques, but the role of 
(some) quantitative techniques is debated. 
Objective Prediction. 
To construct & test predictions & hypotheses 
to establish whether claims are true or false. 
Explanation. 
Claims must be empirically substantiated, but 
quantitative hypothesis testing is inappropriate. 
  
Explanation Explanation confused with prediction. Explanation is `thick´ - an account of the operation of 
causal mechanisms. 
Explanation is confused with prediction. 
 
Prediction Prediction confused with explanation. 
Prediction based on inductive 
generalisations. 
Spurious precision. 
Tendential prediction based on knowledge of causal 
mechanisms. 
 
Tendential prediction is not precise, but not spurious 
either. 
Theory Vehicle for delivering predictions 
 
Vehicle for delivering causal-explanatory accounts. 
Mode of 
inference 
Deduction & induction Retroduction & retrodiction 
 
Table 3 comparative aspects of Quasi-Empiricism and Critical Realism 
 
With the meta-theoretical framing completed, we can now take the first tentative steps to 
show how the above CR meta-theory might be used to guide CRS. 
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5.0 Critical realist synthesis (CRS) 
 
In order to help generate theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations, 
we have amended Pawson’s (2004) realist review process, designed for policy interventions, 
to deal with synthesis more generally (Table 4). As one’s approach to CRS will vary 
considerably depending on its purpose, the steps in this table are not meant to be sequential, 
compulsory or exhaustive, but instead provide a broad steer that is intended to guide CRS. 
 
Define the scope of 
the synthesis 
Identify the focus 
/ question 
• Who are the agents involved? 
• What is the intervention / mechanism being studied? 
• What are the contexts for its use? 
• What are the intentions of those who use it? 
• What is its intended impact? 
What 
mechanisms are 
assumed? 
• Search for assumed mechanisms / theories in the literature / policies 
• Group, categorise or synthesise theories 
• Design set of theories / mechanisms to be explored / tested 
Search for and 
appraise the 
evidence 
Search for the 
evidence 
• Decide and define review strategy 
• Define search sources, terms and methods to be used 
• Set the thresholds for stopping searching at saturation 
Appraise the 
evidence 
• Does the research address the key mechanisms being studied? 
• Does the research support the conclusions it makes? 
Extract and 
synthesise findings 
Extract the results 
• Identify important mechanisms, contexts, entities, stratification etc. 
• Capture these in tables / templates 
• Undertake retroduction to identify further mechanisms. 
Synthesise 
findings 
• What are the common mechanisms, entities, properties and outcomes? 
• Produce ‘thick’ descriptions of the operation of the mechanism(s) 
• How and why do these vary in different contexts? 
• How do these compare to the ‘assumed’ mechanisms? 
Draw conclusions 
• What are the tendencies of the key mechanisms? 
• What are the key contextual factors which have an impact on the 
operation of the mechanism(s) 
 
Table 4 The process of CRS 
 
We now explore each step in more detail. 
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Define the scope of the synthesis 
 
The scope of CRS will often be in the form of a question like: `how does mechanism M, 
when enacted by agent A, tend to alter outcome O?’. This approach will also work for 
clarification questions, such as ‘what are the properties of mechanism M?’ or ‘why does 
outcome O often occur in context P’. As CRs accept systemic openness, CRS is not only 
restricted to providing a ‘thick’ explanation of the agentially enacted mechanism, but also of 
the different contexts in which the mechanism might generate a tendency to O - or 
qualitatively different versions of O - as well as the unintended consequences of mechanism 
M´s tendency. This also permits consideration of the ways in which the outcome might react 
back, in a later time period, on mechanism M and agent A. 
 
In clarifying the purpose of the review, it is also useful to know the mechanisms which are 
claimed or assumed in the relevant literature or policy. For example, in exploring the question 
do bundles of HRM practices improve performance?, it might be useful to identify the 
assumptions which are made, or theories that are drawn upon, when this is presumed to be the 
case, as these provide a focus for the review which can be explored systematically later. This 
step is not always necessary. 
 
Search for, and appraise the evidence 
 
As CRS focuses on identifying agents and mechanisms, it need not restrict itself to statistical 
studies or indeed studies from any specific discipline, including CR. For example, 
O’Mahoney (2011) reviews the social constructionist identity literature, much of which 
explicitly rejects realism, to retroduce the entities, powers, and mechanisms involved with 
identity construction. Indeed, the ecumenical nature of CR’s review of the literature allows it 
to use this breadth to identify similar causal mechanisms working in a variety of contexts.  
Moreover, as Ackroyd and Karlsson suggest, the CR researcher is marked by their 
‘eclecticism’ when it comes to matching innovative methods to collect new data indicative of 
the existence and character of causal mechanisms (2014:22). For example, Pawson (2005) – 
which is expanded upon below - seeks to understand the impact of ‘public disclosure’ on 
recalcitrant behaviour (i.e. does ‘naming and shaming’ work?). To investigate this, he drew 
on a wide range of public disclosure policies, from Megan’s Law and school league tables, to 
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hospital star ratings and naming prostitute’s clients. This allows exploration of similar 
mechanisms but in very different contexts, permitting the identification of the particular 
contexts which were more likely to generate a tendency for disclosure to affect behaviour. 
 
In collecting studies, quantitative work (e.g. those using regression analysis to identify 
statistical associations) should be treated with caution. Instead of dismissing them, however, 
we would check to see if, in addition to the (non-explanatory) statistical data, there is 
something that might help us to create theoretically informed and empirically substantiated 
explanations. Instead, we are far more favourably disposed to past qualitative empirical 
research. In both cases (and recalling section 3.0) we would be asking ourselves: Does this 
past research help us deepen our understanding of the appropriate agents and mechanisms, 
how agents and mechanisms interact, and the other mechanisms (i.e. `the context´) that 
dispose this agent to interact with one mechanism and not another. 
 
CR accepts that different disciplines may use different terms to describe similar mechanisms 
– though where these terms differ they may be more or less accurate. For example, 
‘enculturation’, ‘socialisation’, ‘institutionalisation’, ‘indoctrination’, ‘learning’, and 
‘disciplining’, might be used in different traditions to describe the ways in which societies 
inform and (re)create the individuals which inhabit them. Such terminological diversity 
should always be critically appraised, as such terms are not apolitical, and for example, can 
range from strong managerialism (‘workers can learn to be more efficient’) to critical 
(‘workers are indoctrinated through induction programmes’). However, such diversity should 
also be embraced as providing potentially useful alternative perspectives on how the 
agentially enacted causal mechanisms operate and relate. More specifically, terms captured in 
the review may operate at different (sometimes emergent) levels - for example, socialisation 
and learning may be different (and related) forms of indoctrination.  
 
In short, then, a CR review of a subject should cast its net wide, searching not only for key 
words (such as HRM, bundles and performance) but also examining historical texts, and 
different disciplines for similar mechanisms that may have operated in different contexts. 
Thus, for the literature review, the search terms and sources would usually be wider than we 
might expect in a standard structured literature review (Tranfield et al. 2003). Once the 
relevant literature has been collected, and this would usually be an ongoing process, it needs 
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to be appraised, both in terms of ensuring the research actually addresses the mechanism(s) 
under study, and its internal validity - that the data actually supports the conclusions it makes. 
 
 
Extract and synthesise findings 
 
The purpose of a CRS analysis is to identify the agentially enacted causal mechanisms by 
reviewing extant literature. In CR-oriented studies, these mechanisms will often (though not 
always) be explicit. However, when reviewing non CR-oriented literature the analysis can 
often proceed in two steps. The first is to identify the agentially enacted mechanisms stated 
within the literature, and the second is to retroduce and retrodict further conditions of 
possibility for these. It is important to note that CRS does not require a rejection of any 
research that is not CR in orientation. Let us consider two examples of this latter point. 
 
First, O’Mahoney’s (2011) review, mentioned above, takes the statements of ostensibly anti-
realist authors concerned with identity construction to identify the key agentially enacted 
mechanisms involved. For example, he draws upon an article by Thomas and Davies (2005) 
that details how Kate, a personnel manager in the police service, draws on discourses of 
femininity and parenthood to resist performative employment discourses. O’Mahoney’s first 
step is to identify the context stated explicitly by the authors, including Kate herself, her job, 
the Police, and the various discourses which, for CRs, are causal mechanisms. The second 
step is to retroduce implied mechanisms and powers, such as the power of the Police service 
to employ and discipline workers, and terminate contracts, and the (agential) power of Kate 
to learn skills and reproduce them. We also learn much about discourses – e.g. that they can 
be resisted, that some discourses (such as femininity) exist in tension with others (such as 
masculinity), and that individuals exercise some form of free-will in choosing to engage with 
or resist them. This allows O’Mahoney to argue that, contrary to the anti-realist protestations 
of social constructivists, their research can contribute towards the kind of theoretical 
informed and empirically substantiated explanations sought in CRS. 
 
Second, in seeking to understand the impact of ‘public disclosure’ on recalcitrant behaviour 
Pawson (2005) examines the policy literature to identify the common mechanisms which are 
specified (Figure 1). 
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Insert figure 1 here. 
 
He then reviews the history and operation of the various disclosure policies to identify when 
the mechanisms lead to positive and negative outcomes (Figure 2). For example, he notes 
that, 
 
‘Megan’s Law swept onto the statutes following the enormous public outcry at the 
brutal death [of a child]. The courts responded to the wave of sentiment that 
‘something must be done’ and were thus able to brush aside the constitutional 
challenges forwarded by minor lobbies’ (p. 39). 
 
Insert figure 2 here 
 
Here, Pawson uses contrastive theory building to identify patterns rather than laws (we would 
say `demi-regs´) about the potential of public disclosure policies to achieve their aims. The 
more tentative and less certain language here is also worth noting, especially in contrast with 
the ‘9%’ of meta-analysis detailed earlier. 
 
‘Although popularly known as ‘naming and shaming’, public disclosure outcomes in 
these cases do not seem to depend, in the long term anyway, on the dishonour of the 
culprits. … Public disclosure is meant to change behaviour – but seems effective only 
in relation to what organises that behaviour in the first place. What is more, in each of 
the [cases], it is the information providers rather than the public who are the key 
agents of change’. (p. 44).  
 
In terms of synthesis, Pawson takes a comparative approach to identifying the mechanisms 
which link X and Y, and provides a ‘thick’ description of how and why these work in 
different circumstances. 
 
Whilst no-one has yet carried out an explicit CRS, some CRs have implicitly started to go 
down this route. Three can be cited as examples. First, Fleetwood´s (2014, 2016) attempt to 
build a CR-oriented alternative model of labour markets draws upon a body of existing 
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theoretical and empirical research, that he refers to as `the socio-economics of labour 
markets´. The key point to note is Fleetwood´s rejection of existing quantitative empirical 
research that is rooted in quasi-empiricism because it contributes little or nothing to the 
generation of theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations of the way 
labour markets work. In contrast, Fleetwood accepts the `socio-economics of labour markets´ 
because it consists of existing qualitative empirical research that contributes to the generation 
of theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations of the way labour 
markets work. Whilst implicit, Fleetwood´s work on labour markets might be thought of as a 
rudimentary CRS. 
 
Second, Vincent´s (2011) work, in this journal, focuses attention on emotional experiences at 
work, the organisation control mechanisms which seek to influence these experiences, and 
how different contextual conditions (Mc) affect both organisational control systems and 
worker experiences. Whilst the paper is not explicitly either CR or CRS, it offers a form of 
analysis that is highly consonant with the approach outlined here. The paper maps the 
structural conditions and agential dispositions which affect emotional displays at work, and 
how these combine to explain experiences. It highlights, in in particular, how employers' 
regulation and rewarding of workers' emotional displays interacted with workers conformity 
(or not) with organisational interests and rule systems. The paper then considers the 
contextual conditions that impel different types of control system and experience, for 
example, by highlighting the circumstances in which workers are rewarded for specific 
emotional displays at work. Overall, this paper contributes by developing theoretically 
informed and empirically substantiated insights about the way emotions are managed, 
experienced and enacted at work, offering another rudimentary CRS. 
 
Third, Dirpal (2015) starts from the position that past quantitative empirical research on the 
HRM-Performance cannot explain why HRM practices are linked to performance. He re-
theorises HRM practices to develop the concept of an `HRMechanism´ (i.e. HRM practice + 
causal mechanism) before applying qualitative research techniques to investigate what would 
normally be considered a quantitative research programme. Thus he offers a (meta) 
theoretically informed piece of qualitative research into six HRMechanisms: team working, 
corporate culture, empowerment, work-life balance, performance appraisal and reward. What 
makes Dirpal´s research interesting for our purposes is how he uses past qualitative empirical 
research as a quasi-CRS.  What he lacks, initially, is a sophisticated understanding of exactly 
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how HRM practices may or may not work to influence organisational performance. He turns 
to the existing literature to glean any theoretically informed and empirically substantiated 
insights, uses them to frame his interviews. He finds that team working, performance 
appraisal and work-life balance, generate powers/tendencies to increase organizational 
performance, whereas corporate culture, empowerment and rewards generate neutral 
powers/tendencies vis-á-vis organizational performance. Moreover, he generates causal-
explanations of exactly what these HRMechanisms do to generate these powers/tendencies. 
 
 
Aligning CRS and CR 
 
CRS is built upon the meta-physical claims of CR detailed in Section 4. In this section, we 
provide more detail about the alignment of our approach with specific methodological and 
theoretical applications of CR, namely Bhaskar’s RRRE approach, and Lawson’s contrastive 
explanation approach. 
 
The aims of CRS are of course compatible with CR empirical or applied research. Bhaskar´s 
(1998: 129) RRRE model, for example, suggests the following four steps for undertaking 
such work: 
 
1. Resolution of a complex event into its components (causal analysis). 
2. Redescription of component causes. 
3. Retroduction to possible (antecedent) causes of components via independently 
validated normic statements. 
4. Elimination of alternative possible causes of components 
 
According to Collier, (1994: 163) `RRRE has redescription as its second stage, indicating the 
presence of an already established stock of concepts, well enough defined....to justify using 
them for revisionary description´. We would add that the second and third step definitely, and 
perhaps the first and fourth also, would be impossible to take without existing knowledge 
and, therefore, without drawing upon existing research.   
 
There are, however, two potential problems that we want to eliminate before proceeding. 
First, are we not simply `making a virtue out of a necessity´? After all, RRRE or otherwise, 
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almost all empirical researchers start with existing research. What sets CRS apart, however, is 
that a great deal of meta-theoretical thought goes into identifying precisely the kinds of 
existing research that will be accepted and rejected; not anything `goes´. Second, the same 
could be said of MA: not anything `goes´ for MA´s either. Indeed, they accept existing 
quantitative research, and reject existing qualitative research. This is not, however, because 
MA´s hold that quantitative research delivers theoretically informed and empirically 
substantiated explanations, but simply because only quantitative research can be analysed 
with MA´s statistical toolkit. Thus, CR eliminates research that it holds to be theoretically 
flawed (and for other reasons) whereas MA is driven by a desire to employ specific set of 
statistical techniques. With these potential problems dealt with, we can turn to the issue of 
illustrating how CRs might use CR methods to guide CRS. 
 
Those new to CR often complain about the abstractness of retroduction and retrodiction, and 
so it is important to consider how we can more easily deploy these approaches to extract new 
understanding in the context of CRS. In our view, and whilst far from being a point of 
departure, those wishing to employ CRS can aim towards Lawson’s (1997, 2003, 2009) 
contrastive method. This approach compares ostensibly similar cases (e.g. specific countries, 
such as the UK or China; old or young workers; corporations or charities) to identify different 
or surprising demi-regs, generated by similar causal mechanisms, but calling attention to 
specific contextual features (Mc) that interact to affect outcomes differently in otherwise 
similar circumstances. Thus, rather than explaining a single outcome (set of events En), the 
objective is to account for some contrast "Pn rather than Qn" and to use retroduction and 
retrodiction to identify the particular conditions which drove the outcome in particular 
direction. Arguably, by identifying our analytical target in terms of particular forms of 
difference, in worlds that are otherwise similar, the process of working out the particular 
mechanism that is causal, in one instance or another, becomes much simplified. This way, 
knowledge of causal mechanisms can develop incrementally by reflecting on unexpected 
contrasts in the existing stock of research.  
 
Whilst contrastive explanation offers a viable strategy for knowledge development, as it 
focuses attention on the particular, getting any CRS inspired project to the point at which a 
contrastive strategy is possible typically involves a lot of ground-work (as illustrated in Table 
4). However, as any CRS project assimilates the existing body of knowledge, in CR 
compatible terms, and approaches the point of analytical saturation (when it the review 
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exhausts what we know), it becomes increasingly possible to deploy a contrastive 
explanatory method. At this point, the project will understand the stock of related qualitative 
described cases and examples and the different conditions that explain demi-regs within 
these. As a consequence, CRS scholars will find themselves in a position to explain novel 
causal mechanisms that give rise to unexplained and unexpected events.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The appeal of methods that allow for an integration and synthesis of existing research to 
produce more robust and, even, novel findings is obvious. It is in this context that MA has 
grown in popularity. Yet, even on its own terms, MA has a number of technical, procedural 
and practical problems that can limit its usefulness. More significantly for our argument, the 
meta-theoretical foundations of MA, which have attracted little, if any, critical comment, are 
flawed. We have argued that the lack of explanatory power that characterises individual 
quantitative studies, rooted in quasi-empiricist meta-theory, is the result of their commitment 
to a particular chain of meta-theoretical concepts. Unfortunately, this problem carries over 
into MA, meaning the explanations contained in MA are as lacking in explanatory power as 
the individual quantitative studies upon which they are based.  
 
What then is left for MA? We have argued that regression analyses, and thus MAs, are not 
suitable for the open, emergent systems that typify organisational studies, or indeed, the 
social world generally. This is because the interaction of complex, emergent mechanisms in 
different contexts does not give rise to regularities in relations between events. Yet, for 
critical realists this does not mean jettisoning MA altogether. Two alternatives are proposed 
here. The first is that if MAs are not suited to open systems, then they are suited to closed 
systems, such as IT or the physical sciences, where empirical regularities between events 
exist. This raises an interesting question as to ‘whether some disciplines can be classified as 
‘less open’ / ‘more closed’ on the basis that they concern themselves with simpler or less 
emergent systems. The answer to this question is contested and cannot be explored in detail 
here, but Fleetwood (2016) provides an overview of the key issues, arguing that systems are 
either open or closed. 
 
The second approach is implied by Porpora (2015: 62): 
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Demoting regression analysis and other statistical techniques from explanation to 
evidence, critical realism has no reason to reject them as such....Statistics are 
employed to indicate the contingent operation of a mechanism in a particular context. 
 
This shift in this framing of MAs implies that well-designed regression analyses (and 
therefore MAs) can provide indications that causality may be at work, or at least that 
phenomena require investigation. For example, research claiming to identify a statistical 
association between bundles of HRM practices and improved organisational performance, 
have prompted authors to carefully investigate the mechanisms and contexts that might 
sustain such an association (Fleetwood and Hesketh, 2006). Importantly, subsequent 
investigation can, and sometimes does, undermine claims deriving from these statistical 
associations. In the MOS literature, for example, quantitative research claiming to have 
identified an association between HRM practices (e.g. TQM, BPR or Lean) in high 
performing organisations, have been exposed by qualitative studies revealing flawed 
assumptions. Some qualitative research, for example, has suggested that reporting of these 
practices has been exaggerated by respondents (e.g. Collinson et al., 1998).  
 
Our critique of MA led us to develop an alternative, CRS, which is driven by the objective of 
creating theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations. CRS, rooted in 
CR meta-theory and predicated upon the claim that the social world is characterised by demi-
regs, requires a conception of causality that is not exhausted by regularities in the flux of 
events, but is understood at the relative push and pull of powers or tendencies. As we 
demonstrate in part four, this allows CRs to make tendential predictions and, thereby, generate 
substantive implications. We explained how CRS allows for insights to be incorporated from 
the widest possible source material, including qualitative research, social constructionist-
oriented research and, with caution, some quantitative, empirical research. CRS resonates 
with work on systematic reviews by other realist scholars, such as Pawson, and thus 
contributes to debates already existing in social science, more generally, about how realist 
philosophical commitments might shape analyses. 
 
Although we hold that CRS is a superior approach to that of MA, we note here that CRS does 
have a number of problematic features. First, the method of CRS is less formulaic than that of 
MA, putting more emphasis on the intuition (via retroduction and retrodiction) of the 
researcher. Moreover, the outcome of CRS is more complex than the single number generated 
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by MA, and perhaps therefore less attractive to some managers or policy makers. We would 
hope, however, that our proposal places an emphasis on the expertise and experience of these 
people in helping understand the complexities of the world in which they are embedded. 
Secondly, tendential predictions are only that. As Pawson et al. note: social interventions are 
so complex that there is little hope of reproducing them, and even if one could, they are so 
context specific that the same ‘assemblage’ may go onto misfire’ (2005:21). Thirdly, although 
we have pointed to examples of good practice in parts of a CRS (e.g. O’Mahoney 2011; 
Pawson 2005; Fleetwood 2014; Vincent, 2011), and explained how we would approach a 
CRS, we have not found an examples of a complete CRS. This is a gap that we would urge 
researchers to explore.   
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